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Abstract
Machine learning (ML) started to become widely deployed
in cyber security settings for shortening the detection cycle
of cyber attacks. To date, most ML-based systems are either
proprietary or make specific choices of feature representations
and machine learning models. The success of these techniques
is difficult to assess as public benchmark datasets are currently
unavailable. In this paper, we provide concrete guidelines and
recommendations for using supervised ML in cyber security.
As a case study, we consider the problem of botnet detection
from network traffic data. Among our findings we highlight
that: (1) feature representations should take into consideration
attack characteristics; (2) ensemble models are well-suited to
handle class imbalance; (3) the granularity of ground truth
plays an important role in the success of these methods.
1 Introduction
A wide spectrum of threats ranging from opportunistic mali-
cious activities to sophisticated nation-sponsored campaigns
threaten organizations from industry, academia, and govern-
ment. These attacks usually result in loss of important infor-
mation and affect consumers and businesses alike. Notable
examples are the Equifax data breach in 2017 and the An-
them healthcare campaign in 2015 that compromised personal
financial and medical records for millions of US citizens.
To date, most enterprises deploy many security controls in
their environments and apply best practice (such as patching
vulnerable systems, use of threat intelligence services, and
endpoint scanning) to protect against cyber threats. Monitor-
ing tools are deployed in most organizations either on the
network (e.g., network intrusion-detection systems, web prox-
ies, firewalls) or on the end hosts (e.g., anti-virus software,
endpoint agents). With the availability of security logs col-
lected by large enterprises, machine learning (ML) started to
become an important defensive tool in face of increasingly so-
phisticated cyber attacks. ML techniques applied to network
data include systems for detecting malicious domains (e.g.,
[1, 5, 2]), methods for detecting malware delivery (e.g., [9])
or command-and-control communication [4, 11, 8, 12], tech-
niques for detecting malicious web pages (e.g., [15]), and
various industry products for enterprise threat detection (e.g.,
[13, 6, 10, 7, 16]).
ML has a lot of potential in shortening the malware detec-
tion cycle, but these algorithms tend to come with a number
of shortcomings. In particular, Sommer and Paxson [14] high-
lighted the difficulties of using ML in operational settings
for cyber security. The main limitations they identified were:
(1) ML excels at supervised tasks by learning from labeled
examples, while in cyber security most of the data is unla-
beled. (2) ML errors (and in particular false positives) have
high cost as alerts need to be investigated by security ana-
lysts. (3) Network traffic exhibits high diversity under normal
operating conditions. (4) Performing sound evaluations is usu-
ally challenging due to unavailability of standard benchmark
datasets.
In this paper, we describe some concrete guidelines and
recommendations for using supervised ML in cyber security.
As a case study, we consider the problem of botnet detec-
tion from network traffic data. We leverage a public dataset
(CTU-13) which includes network traffic collected from a
university campus and attacks launched on the university net-
work. Among our findings, we highlight the following:
• Feature representations should take into consideration
the specifics of the attacks. Among standard feature rep-
resentations, we compare connection-level features (ex-
tracted directly from Bro logs) with aggregated traffic
statistics and temporal features (using fixed time win-
dows).
• Class imbalance is a major issue that hinders the perfor-
mance of simple linear models such as logistic regres-
sion.
• Ensemble methods such as gradient boosting have built-
in techniques that can handle class imbalance well. They
achieve better performance at classifying malicious and
benign connections compared to linear models.
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• The granularity of data labeling (ground truth) can im-
pact the classification metrics substantially. If available,
ground truth obtained at the level of individual network
connections can boost the performance of supervised
ML models.
2 Background and Threat Model
2.1 Machine Learning for Network Traffic
Classification
Network Intrusion Detection is a highly active area of re-
search. Traditional systems such as Snort are based on
manually-generated rules for detecting well-known malware
variants.
Recently, ML has proven to be valuable in augmenting
rule-based systems. ML has the potential of detecting more
advanced malicious activities that evade rule-based systems.
Successful applications of ML to various types of network
data for malware detection include:
• Domain reputation systems using passive DNS data,
such as Notos [1] and EXPOSURE [5].
• Command-and-control detection based on NetFlow data,
such as DISCLOSURE [4] and BotFinder [17].
• Malicious communication detection using web-proxy
logs, such as ExecScent [11], BAYWATCH [8], and
MADE [12].
Bro is an open-source network monitoring agent that col-
lects a number of network logs. Here we leverage the Bro
connection logs, which record the fields included in Fig-
ure 1. These include the TCP connection timestamp, duration,
source IP and port, destination IP and port, number of packets
sent and received, number of bytes sent and received, and
connection state. For UDP, an entry is generated for every
UDP packet (as there do not exist connections over UDP).
2.2 Problem statement and threat model
ML algorithms have demonstrated success in network traffic
classification tasks for detecting botnets or malicious domains.
However, most ML methods are designed in an ad-hoc manner
and guidelines for principled approaches in this space are
currently missing. We are interested in filling this gap and
providing recommendations on several general principles that
should guide ML design for botnet and malware detection. We
are specifically addressing the problem of detecting botnets
from network logs (as generated by Bro logs), but our methods
can be used with other network data types (such as NetFlow,
pcap, firewalls). Some of the research questions we would
like to answer are the following:
Figure 1: Fields in Bro connection log.
• Can raw network data be used effectively in an ML al-
gorithm?
• Which feature representations are most appropriate for
applying ML classification algorithms?
• Which classifiers achieve best performance in handling
the largely imbalanced cyber-security datasets?
• What is the impact of labeling the data for ground truth
generation?
We assume that the monitoring agent, which collects the
network data, is not under the attacker’s control. We also
assume that the attacker cannot tamper with the collected
network logs. Therefore, attackers do not have access to the
storage device where data is recorded. 1
3 Case Study on ML for Botnet Detec-
tion
3.1 Dataset
We leverage a dataset of botnet traffic that was captured in
2011 at the CTU University in the Czech Republic. The
dataset includes 13 scenarios, each including legitimate traffic,
as well as various attacks such as spam, port scanning, DDOS,
and click fraud. The dataset also includes a list of botnet IPs
that can be used for labeling the traffic.
Since ML classification needs to use similar attack data for
training and testing, we decided to use a subset of 6 scenarios.
Among these, 3 scenarios are generated by botnet Neris (per-
forming spam and click fraud activity), and 3 scenarios are
generated by botnet Rbot (performing DDoS activity). The
statistics are in Table 1. For other botnets, there was only one
1Attackers with access to the monitoring environment and the system
logs are much more powerful, and are beyond our current scope.
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Figure 2: Overview of the system architecture.
scenario available and that precluded the use of supervised
ML.
In traditional ML, cross-validation is a well-known method
to evaluate the generalization of a model. k-fold cross-
validation splits the data into k partitions at random, trains
a model on k− 1 of them and evaluates it on the k-th parti-
tion. Splitting the logs at random produces highly-correlated
data between training and testing sets. Instead, we train on
two scenarios, and test on the third (independent) scenario,
repeating the experiment 3 times for each of the two botnets.
We have thus assurances that testing data is independent from
training. This method of splitting the data into training and
testing (based on independent attack scenario) is more appro-
priate for this setting. In other contexts, the specifics of the
environment need to be taken into consideration.
3.2 Overview
We show our system architecture in Figure 2. Our system pro-
cesses network logs collected at the border of an organization
(i.e., campus or enterprise network). After data collection, a
feature extraction layer is employed to prepare the data for
ML training. A number of classification algorithms are used
to train a classifier and optimize for standard metrics, such
as precision, recall, F1 score, and AUC. The classifiers are
applied to new testing scenarios in order to evaluate their
generality and predict suspicious network activity. We believe
that this framework is general enough to be applicable in other
environments.
3.3 Feature extraction
We experiment with different feature representations, as de-
scribed below.
Connection-level representation. This representation ex-
tracts features directly from the raw connection logs. We
consider all connections in which ip is either id.orig h or
id.dest h and we use directly the fields from the Bro con-
nection logs as features:
ts,id.orig h,id.orig p,id.dest h,
id.dest p,proto,duration,orig bytes,
resp bytes,orig pkts,resp pkts
For categorical features (e.g., proto) we use standard one-
hot encoding. In this representation, we obtained 26 features
after one-hot encoding.
Aggregated traffic statistics. Next, we would like to explore
if features obtained by time aggregation are more powerful
than raw features. We consider a time interval of length T
over which we define aggregated features over all connections
in which ip is either id.orig h or id.dest h.
An important consideration when defining our features is
to generate a fixed number of features, independent of the
traffic at a particular host. In our first attempt, we consider
the set of all destination IP addresses that ip communicates
with: SIP = {IP1, . . . , IPn}. From these we can define the
set of /24 destination subnets that ip communicates with:
Ssubnet = {Sub1, . . . ,Subm}, with m ≤ n. If we define aggre-
gated features per destination or subnet, we will encounter
an issue when a host visits new IPs or new destinations. In
that case, we need to add new features to our representation,
which is not desirable in practice.
To alleviate this problem, we define our aggregated features
by destination port (corresponding to applications or network
services). Specifically, we define a set of 17 popular applica-
tion ports (e.g., HTTP - 80, HTTPS - 443, SSH - 22, DNS -
53). We then take a modular approach. We select a small num-
ber of operators (Distinct, Sum, Min, Max) and apply them to
fields in conn.log for each destination port. The features are
described in Table 2. We generate these features separately
for outgoing and incoming connections. Additionally, we add
some features that capture communication patterns with exter-
nal IP destinations (e.g., number of connections per transport
protocol, number of source and destination ports, number of
destination IPs, etc.). In this representation, we obtain 756
aggregated traffic features.
3
Botnet Scenario Attack Botnet Botnet Background Background
raw aggregated raw aggregated
Neris 1 Spam, click fraud 31,089 569 3,067,241 76,614
2 Spam, click fraud 39,730 407 1,872,270 54,675
9 Spam, click fraud 111,895 2893 1,689,040 62,970
port scan
Rbot 4 ICMP, UDP 126,438 122 869,648 49,041
10 ICMP, UDP 10,102,210 741 988,870 55,160
11 UDP 251,814 20 75,069 3169
Table 1: CTU-13 botnet scenarios.
Category Field Operator Definition
IPs id.dest h Distinct Number of IPs communicated with per port
(Per port) Distinct Number of Subnets communicated with per port
Duration duration Sum Total duration of connection per port
(Per port) Min Min duration of connection per port
Max Max duration of connection per port
Bytes orig bytes Sum Total bytes sent by ip per port
(Per port) Min Min bytes sent by ip in a connection per port
Max Max bytes sent by ip in a connection per port
resp bytes Sum Total bytes received by ip per port
Min Min bytes received by ip in a connection per port
Max Max bytes received by ip in a connection per port
Packets orig pkts Sum Total packets sent by ip per port
(Per port) Min Min packets sent by ip in a connection per port
Max Max packets sent by ip in a connection per port
resp pkts Sum Total packets received by ip per port
Min Min packets received by ip in a connection per port
Max Max packets received by ip in a connection per port
Traffic statistics proto Sum Number of connections per transport protocol (TCP, UDP, ICMP)
id.orig p Distinct Number of source ports
id.dest h Distinct Number of external destination IPs
id.dest p Distinct Number of destination ports
Table 2: Traffic features aggregated by time. The top 4 categories of features are defined per port.
Temporal features. Considering the same time interval T as
with the aggregated connection-level features, we define inter-
arrival features on a node as the mean, standard deviation,
median, minimum, and maximum of the time distribution
between node communications. Each internal node has two
such sets of features: one for events where the node serves as
the source of communication (outgoing), and one where it is
the target (incoming). These communications are aggregated
by common ports. Thus, in each time interval T , a node i
will have the inter-arrival features listed in Table 3. In this
representation, we obtain 180 features.
3.4 ML classification and labeling
Ground truth labeling CTU-13 dataset provides a list of
botnet IP addresses. One of our main observations is that
the attack is not active during the duration of the entire data
collection. We found that the granularity at which we label
the data plays a large role in the results. We experiment with
two levels of granularity:
• Coarse-grained labeling: We label all the connection
logs generated by the botnet IPs as Malicious during the
entire scenario period.
• Fine-grained labeling: For the Rbot attack (an instance
of DDoS), we obtain the IP address of the victim ma-
chine. We use that to identify the attack flows that con-
nect to the victim IP. For all feature representations, we
label a time window as Malicious if there is at least one
attack log event in that time window.
Fine-grained labeling is difficult to obtain in general be-
cause it is a manual process, but when it is available it im-
proves significantly the performance of ML in botnet detec-
tion.
4
Category Statistics Definition
Outgoing Mean, std. dev., median, min, max Statistics of inter-arrival distribution for outgoing traffic
Incoming Mean, std. dev., median, min, max Statistics of inter-arrival distribution for incoming traffic
Table 3: Temporal features aggregated by time. Each of these features is defined per port.
ML models We consider several well-known ML classifica-
tion models, including logistic regression, random forest, and
gradient boosting. We use several metrics to evaluate the per-
formance of the ML algorithms (precision, recall, F1 score,
and AUC). As the imbalance is quite large in this dataset
(the ratio of Malicious to Legitimate samples is as low as
1:134 for Neris and 1:401 for Rbot with features aggregated at
30-second intervals), the accuracy is always quite high (above
0.96 in all our experiments). We are interested in results on the
minority (Malicious) class, thus precision, recall, F1 score,
and AUC are better indicators of how the classifiers perform
at detecting botnets.
For the ML classifiers, we perform a grid search on several
hyper-parameters to select the models performing best in our
setting. For Random Forest, we selected the number of trees
in {10,50,100,200} and found that 100 tree worked best. For
Gradient Boosting, we varied the number of estimators in
{50,100,200}, the maximum depth of each tree in {3,5,7}
and learning rate in {0.01,0.05,0.1}. We selected 100 es-
timators with maximum depth of 3 and learning rate 0.05.
For logistic regression, we used L1 or Lasso regularization to
reduce the space dimension.
4 Experimental Evaluation
During our experimental evaluation, we would like to answer
several research questions, which we detail below.
Which feature representation performs best? We compare
different feature representations (connection-level representa-
tion, aggregated traffic statistics, and temporal features). For
this experiment, we use a random forest classifier with 100
trees and a 30-second time window for aggregation.
The results for Neris are in Table 4 and they show that
aggregated features (both traffic statistics and temporal) per-
form significantly better than raw features extracted directly
from Bro logs at all metrics of interest. For instance, when
training on scenarios 2 and 9 and testing on scenario 1, the
F1 score for connection features is 0.65, while the F1 score
for aggregated features is 0.98. We do not observe a major
difference when we consider both traffic and timing features,
compared to using only aggregated traffic features.
The results for Rbot for fine-grained labeling are in Ta-
ble 5. Here, connection-based features perform quite well.
The reason is that this is a DDoS attack in which all packets
sent to the victim are identical. However, traffic statistics and
temporal features also perform well. The exception is when
Features Training Testing Prec. Recall F1 AUC
Scenarios Scenario
Connection 2,9 1 0.68 0.62 0.65 0.87
1,9 2 0.89 0.43 0.58 0.88
1,2 9 0.92 0.70 0.80 0.94
Traffic 2,9 1 0.99 0.98 0.98 0.99
1,9 2 0.94 0.96 0.95 0.99
1,2 9 1 0.90 0.94 0.96
Traffic and 2,9 1 0.99 0.97 0.98 0.99
Temporal 1,9 2 0.95 0.96 0.95 0.98
1,2 9 1 0.90 0.94 0.96
Table 4: Classification metrics for the Neris botnet for Ran-
dom Forest with different feature representations. Best results
are highlighted in bold.
Features Training Testing Prec. Recall F1 AUC
Scenarios Scenario
Connection 10,11 4 0.99 0.99 0.99 0.99
4,11 10 0.99 0.99 0.99 0.99
4,10 11 0.99 0.99 0.99 0.99
Traffic 10,11 4 1 1 1 1
4,11 10 1 0.85 0.92 0.92
4,10 11 1 1 1 1
Traffic and 10,11 4 1 1 1 1
Temporal 4,11 10 1 0.85 0.92 0.92
4,10 11 1 1 1 1
Table 5: Classification metrics for the Rbot botnet for Random
Forest with different feature representations and fine-grained
labeling. Best results are highlighted in bold.
training on scenarios 4 and 11, and testing on scenario 10. In
that case, the amount of botnet samples used for training with
30-second aggregation is very small (142), while there are
much more botnet samples in the raw data (378,252).
What is the impact of varying the time window? Here, we
validate the choice of the time window for aggregation. Ta-
ble 6 and Figure 3 show results for varying the time window
from 1 to 600 seconds. The 30-second and 60-second time
windows exhibit similar results and they are performing well
most of the time. Window size 10 is also performing well,
except when testing on scenario 1. As the time window in-
creases beyond 120 seconds, the results start to degrade. We
suspect this is because of the small samples of attack traffic at
larger aggregation windows, as well as additional noise in the
legitimate traffic. In general, selecting the best time window
for aggregation is attack-dependent. We recommend the use
of cross-validation for selecting the optimal value of the time
window. Based on these results, we select a time window of
30 seconds for the rest of experiments.
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Figure 3: F1 scores for different time windows for Neris.
Time Training Testing Prec. Recall F1 AUC
(seconds) Scenarios Scenario
1 2,9 1 0.89 0.87 0.88 0.98
1,9 2 0.92 0.87 0.90 0.98
1,2 9 0.98 0.89 0.93 0.98
10 2,9 1 0.84 0.98 0.91 0.99
1,9 2 0.96 0.96 0.96 0.99
1,2 9 1 0.92 0.96 0.98
30 2,9 1 0.99 0.97 0.98 0.99
1,9 2 0.95 0.96 0.95 0.98
1,2 9 1 0.90 0.94 0.96
60 2,9 1 0.99 0.97 0.98 0.99
1,9 2 0.95 0.96 0.95 0.98
1,2 9 1 0.87 0.93 0.95
120 2,9 1 0.97 0.97 0.97 0.99
1,9 2 0.91 0.94 0.92 0.98
1,2 9 0.99 0.82 0.90 0.92
240 2,9 1 0.94 0.97 0.95 0.99
1,9 2 0.85 0.92 0.89 0.97
1,2 9 1 0.75 0.85 0.89
600 2,9 1 0.87 1 0.93 0.99
1,9 2 0.76 0.90 0.83 0.99
1,2 9 1 0.59 0.74 0.82
Table 6: Classification metrics for the Neris botnet for Ran-
dom Forest with different time windows. We used the aggre-
gated traffic statistics and temporal features. Best results are
highlighted in bold.
What is the impact of different ML models? One important
observation is that the amount of imbalance in cyber security
is very large (as also observed by previous work [3, 12]). It is
well-known that ensemble classifiers such as random forests
and boosting handle imbalance much better than simpler mod-
els. We test this hypotheses by using three different classifiers
for our task: logistic regression, random forests, and gradient
boosting. We fix the aggregation time window to 30 seconds
and use the traffic statistics and temporal features.
The results for three classifiers for Neris are in Table 7 and
the precision-recall curves are in Figure 4. All three models
we experimented with perform relatively well. Both ensemble
method perform better than the logistic regression model, with
F1 scores reaching between 0.94 and 0.98 on all scenarios.
The difference between random forest and gradient boosting
is imperceptible, they are both powerful classification models.
Figure 4: Precision-recall curves for three classifiers for Neris.
Model Training Testing Prec. Recall F1 AUC
Scenarios Scenario
Logistic 2,9 1 0.90 0.90 0.90 0.94
Regression 1,9 2 0.98 0.95 0.97 0.99
1,2 9 0.97 0.87 0.92 0.96
Random 2,9 1 0.99 0.97 0.98 0.99
Forest 1,9 2 0.95 0.96 0.95 0.98
1,2 9 1 0.90 0.94 0.96
Gradient 2,9 1 1 0.97 0.98 0.99
boosting 1,9 2 1 0.92 0.96 0.99
1,2 9 1 0.87 0.93 0.95
Table 7: Classification metrics for the Neris botnet for three
classifiers for aggregated traffic statistics and temporal fea-
tures (aggregation window 30 seconds). Best results are high-
lighted in bold.
Are the models interpretable? To understand what the ML
models learned, we computed feature importance for the ran-
dom forest classifier for both Neris and Rbot (using the ag-
gregated traffic statistics and timing features at 30-second
window). The results are in Table 8. Interestingly, we observe
that the classifier identifies features that are correlated with
the attack. Neris is a spam botnet and most of its activity
uses port 25, making features such as distinct source ports
and median inter-arrival packet time on port 25 most relevant.
In contrast, Rbot is a DDoS botnet that uses different ports
for the attack. For instance, the UDP flood is using port 161,
and the classifier correctly determines that the standard de-
viation of inter-arrival packet timing on port 161 is the most
important feature.
These results show our framework’s flexibility and ability
to generalize to different attack patterns. We defined a set of
936 generic features that can be used for a variety of botnet
attacks. For the two different botnets we experimented with,
the ML models identified the most relevant features that are
correlated with the attacks, without the need for a human
expert to explicitly locate those features. Models such as
random forest provide standard metrics for feature importance,
with a clear advantage for model interpretability compared to
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Botnet Feature Port Importance
Neris Distinct source ports 25 0.085
Median inter-arrival time 25 0.070
Distinct destination ports 25 0.067
Min packets sent 25 0.061
Distinct external IPs 25 0.054
Total duration 25 0.053
Total packets sent 25 0.051
Max duration of connection 25 0.048
Rbot Std. dev. of inter-arrival time 161 0.049
Distinct source ports 135 0.046
Distinct source ports Other 0.043
Min inter-arrival timing 138 0.042
Distinct source ports 138 0.040
Distinct source ports 3 0.038
Distinct source ports 8 0.030
Std. dev. of inter-arrival time 138 0.029
Table 8: Feature importance for the Neris botnet (top) and
the Rbot botnet (bottom). All these features are for outgoing
connections from an internal node.
deep learning and neural networks that lack interpretability.
Interpretability is important in cyber security, as most of the
time human experts analyze the alerts of ML systems.
What is the impact of labeling flows accurately? We per-
form an experiment to test how the granularity of data labeling
impacts the classification results. For the Rbot DDoS botnet
we have access to the IP address of the victim machine and
thus we can determine which connections are botnet-related.
We refer to fine-grained labeling to the process of labeling
only the botnet connection to victim IP as Malicious. We
refer to coarse-grained labeling to the process of labeling all
connections initiated by the botnet IP as Malicious.
Table 9 shows the results of fine-grained and coarse-grained
labeling for the Random Forest and Gradient Boosting clas-
sifiers for features aggregated at 30-second intervals. The
results demonstrate that classifier performance obtained with
fine-grained labeling is much better than using coarse-grained
labeling. For instance, when training on scenarios 10 and 11,
and testing on scenario 4, the F1 score for coarse-grained
labeling is 0.44, compared to a perfect F1 score for fine-
grained labeling. Both classifiers perform here similarly for
fine-grained labeling.
5 Lessons and General Recommenda-
tions
Motivated by our case study of botnet classification from Bro
logs, we highlight several guidelines that we believe are ap-
plicable in other settings where ML is used in cyber security.
Multiple feature representations need to be evaluated.
Features extracted directly from raw data such as Bro con-
nection logs do not always results in the most optimal rep-
resentation. A representation that worked well in our setting
for classifying internal IP addresses is feature aggregation
by time windows and port number. We also observed that
feature representation depends on the amount of training data
Model Label Training Testing Prec. Recall F1 AUC
Scenarios Scenario
Random C 10,11 4 0.75 0.31 0.44 0.94
Forest 4,11 10 0.99 0.76 0.86 0.90
4,10 11 0.93 0.75 0.83 0.91
Random F 10,11 4 1 1 1 1
Forest 4,11 10 1 0.85 0.92 0.92
4,10 11 1 1 1 1
Gradient C 10,11 4 1 0.27 0.42 0.84
boosting 4,11 10 0.99 0.74 0.84 0.95
4,10 11 1 0.75 0.85 0.92
Gradient F 10,11 4 1 1 1 1
boosting 4,11 10 1 0.85 0.92 0.92
4,10 11 1 1 1 1
Table 9: Classification metrics for the Rbot botnet for two
methods of labeling the data (coarse-grained or C and fine-
grained or F). We used the Random Forest (100 trees) and
Gradient Boosting classifiers for aggregated traffic statistics
and temporal features (aggregation window 30 seconds). Best
results are highlighted in bold.
available. With the large imbalance between the malicious
and benign classes, smaller time windows work better for
aggregation. However, the right feature representation and the
choice of time window for feature aggregation are dependent
on the attack type. We recommend evaluating multiple feature
representations.
Model interpretability. Models that provide interpretability
are preferred in cyber security as security analysts need to in-
vestigate the alerts raised by ML systems. Understanding why
a flow is labeled as malicious can speed up the investigation
significantly. We showed how a random forest classifier is
interpretable by identifying most relevant features that clearly
provide insights about the botnet activity.
Data imbalance raises a challenge for supervised learn-
ing. Data imbalance results in a huge challenge when apply-
ing classification methods to cyber security. Simpler models
such as linear models are not equipped to deal well with class
imbalance. We showed that ensemble models such as ran-
dom forest and gradient boosting achieve good results even
in highly imbalanced scenario, compared to logistic regres-
sion. For instance, at an imbalance of 1:134 (when testing on
scenario 2 for Neris) we obtain 0.97 precision and 0.95 recall
with gradient boosting.
The alternative to classification is to employ anomaly-
detection models that learn from the legitimate class and
identify attacks as anomalies. Nevertheless, Sommer and Pax-
son [14] discussed extensively the difficulty of using anomaly
detection in cyber security. We plan to investigate the perfor-
mance of anomaly detectors in future work.
Fine-grained ground truth labeling can be a major factor
in the success of supervised learning. As we demonstrated,
data labeling for generating the ground truth plays a major
factor in measuring the success of supervised learning algo-
rithms. If detailed information about the attack is available
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(e.g., the destination IPs contacted by attacker), then the per-
formance of classifiers can be greatly improved. However, it
is difficult most of the time to identify exactly the attack flows,
even when running cotrolled attack simulations. Malware can
contact a variety of IP addresses using different protocols, but
infected machines also generate a fair number of legitimate
connections (e.g., connections to Window updates).
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